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________________  
 
  OPINION 
________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 The Delaware State Police obtained search 
warrants for Paul Pavulak‘s email account and workplace 
after receiving information that he was viewing child 
pornography on his workplace computers.  The evidence 
that was seized confirmed Pavulak‘s involvement in child 
pornography, and a jury subsequently convicted him of 
possessing and attempting to produce child pornography, 
attempting to entice a minor, and committing crimes 
related to his status as a sex offender.  The District Court 
sentenced him to life imprisonment on the attempted-
production conviction and to 120 months‘ imprisonment 
on the remaining counts. 
Pavulak now contends that the District Court 
should have suppressed the evidence obtained pursuant to 
the warrants.  He argues that the magistrate lacked 
probable cause to issue the search warrants.  Those 
search warrants were supported by an affidavit that 
pointed to Pavulak‘s prior child-molestation convictions 
and labeled the images, which had been reported by 
informants, simply as ―child pornography.‖  No further 
details concerning the images‘ content appeared in the 
affidavit.  We conclude that the affidavit was insufficient 
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to establish probable cause for child pornography.  
However, because the officers reasonably relied on the 
warrants in good faith, we agree that the District Court 
properly denied suppression.  Pavulak‘s remaining 
challenges to his convictions and life sentence are 
meritless.  We will therefore affirm his convictions and 
sentence. 
I. 
A. Factual Background 
This is not Paul Pavulak‘s first encounter with the 
criminal law.  He has twice pled guilty to unlawful sexual 
contact in the second degree under Delaware law—once 
in June 1998 and again in April 2005.  The first 
conviction was for molesting the eleven-year-old 
daughter of his live-in girlfriend from September 1997 
through January 1998.  As a result, the Delaware 
Superior Court sentenced Pavulak to four years‘ 
probation.  While on probation for that conviction during 
the summer of 1999, Pavulak repeated similar conduct 
with the nine-year-old daughter of his new girlfriend, 
resulting in a second conviction in 2005 and two years in 
prison.
1
 
These state convictions required Pavulak to 
                                                 
1
 The record does not identify the reason for the delay 
between Pavulak‘s conduct and the second conviction. 
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register as a sex offender and to keep his residential, 
work, and email addresses up to date with the Delaware 
State Police.  After being released from prison on July 1, 
2008, Pavulak purported to do exactly that.  He informed 
the Delaware State Police that he was unemployed and 
staying at the Fairview Inn in Wilmington, Delaware.  
Throughout the remainder of the year, Pavulak 
maintained this account of unemployment and hotel 
living. 
 But the Delaware State Police soon discovered that 
Pavulak was not telling the whole story.  In October 
2008, Delaware State Police Detective Robert Jones 
received a hotline call from Erica Ballard.  Ballard 
informed the police that her husband Curtis Mack, an 
employee at Concrete Technologies, Inc. (―CTI‖), had 
observed Pavulak working and living part-time at the 
CTI office since his release, information that his sex-
offender registration did not include.  Ballard also told 
the police that Pavulak was planning a trip to the 
Philippines where he intended to meet women.  Detective 
Jones followed up with Mack, who not only confirmed 
his wife‘s tip but also provided additional details.  
According to Mack, Pavulak was using an unregistered 
Yahoo! email address (Pavy224@yahoo.com), was 
accessing sexually suggestive images of children on 
computers at the CTI office, and had scheduled a month-
long trip to the Philippines between December 2008 and 
mid-January 2009.  Detective Jones also contacted 
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another CTI employee, Jahdel Riggs, who confirmed all 
of Mack‘s information except Pavulak‘s email address. 
 Through investigation, the Delaware State Police 
successfully corroborated some of the information 
provided by Mack and Riggs.  As confirmed by federal 
agents and Pavulak‘s updated Delaware Sex Offender 
Registry address, Pavulak was in the Philippines from 
early December 2008 to January 2009.  By subpoenaing 
Yahoo!, the police also discovered that the 
Pavy224@yahoo.com email account was created by a 
―Mr. Paul Pavy,‖ was accessed from the CTI office on 
December 8, 2008, and was accessed from the 
Philippines from December 10, 2008, through January 6, 
2009.  The police further verified the existence and 
location of the CTI office, its ownership by Pavulak‘s 
adult children, and his Delaware state convictions—
leading the police to obtain an arrest warrant for 
Pavulak‘s failure to register his employment at CTI. 
 Armed with the informants‘ information and the 
results of their investigation, Detective Nancy Skubik of 
the Delaware State Police Child Predator Task Force 
applied to the Delaware Superior Court for New Castle 
County for warrants to search the CTI office and the 
Pavy224@yahoo.com account for child pornography.  In 
her probable-cause affidavit
2
 for both warrant 
                                                 
2
 The affidavits for both search-warrant applications are 
identical in all aspects relating to the probable-cause 
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applications, Detective Skubik described the two tips, 
Pavulak‘s prior Delaware convictions from 1998 and 
2005, and the information corroborated by her 
investigation.  The affidavit relayed that Riggs had seen 
Pavulak ―viewing child pornography‖ of females 
―between 16 and 18 years old‖ and Mack had seen 
―images of females between the ages of 12 to 15 years on 
Pavulak‘s computer‖ that had been sent to Pavulak via 
email.  But the affidavit neither defined what was meant 
by the label ―child pornography‖ nor provided any 
further details about the images‘ content. 
 Based on that affidavit, the Delaware Superior 
Court issued search warrants on January 13, 2009, for the 
CTI office and Yahoo! account.  Early in the morning of 
January 19, Delaware State Police officers, including 
Detectives Jones and Skubik, executed the search warrant 
at CTI‘s office.  The police arrested Pavulak, the only 
person present in the CTI office, based on outstanding 
warrants for failure to register his employment at CTI 
and his Yahoo! email address.  After receiving his 
Miranda rights,
3
 Pavulak admitted that he worked for 
CTI and used the Pavy224@yahoo.com email address 
while in the Philippines.   
 During the search, officers seized two computers.  
                                                                                                             
determination, so we refer to them as though they were a 
single affidavit. 
3
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
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The first, a Hewlett-Packard laptop, was found in a rear 
office where Pavulak appeared to be living; a bed, his 
clothing, and toiletries were in the room.  The laptop was 
locked by a single password-protected Windows user 
account.  The second computer, a Hewlett-Packard 
desktop, was recovered from the receptionist area.  Each 
computer contained thousands of images of child 
pornography. 
 Yet the search uncovered more than just the 
sought-after images of child pornography.  Evidence 
recovered from the computers revealed that, in August 
2008, Pavulak used his Yahoo! username ―Pavy224‖ to 
create a profile on www.cherryblossoms.com, a website 
allegedly used by sex tourists for soliciting prostitutes in 
the Philippines.  This website led him to Ara Duran, a 
twenty-two-year-old Philippine woman and mother of 
two-year-old Jane Doe.
4
  Emails that Pavulak sent Duran 
showed his immediate interest in the age and sex of 
Duran‘s child.  Pavulak told Duran (via email) that he 
was looking for a wife with an ―aggressive‖ and ―very 
active open sex desire‖5 similar to his own and who was 
willing to ―experiment with different possibilities about 
sex.‖  On October 1, Duran responded, believing them to 
                                                 
4
 Like the parties, we refer to the daughter as ―Jane Doe‖ 
to protect her privacy. 
5
 Any typographical errors in text messages or chat logs 
appear in Pavulak‘s original communications. 
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be a ―good match‖ and indicating that she ―bought more 
panties‖ for herself and her daughter.  Pavulak looked 
forward to ―dressing‖ Duran and her daughter.  The two 
made plans to meet around Christmas during Pavulak‘s 
trip to the Philippines.  He reserved a hotel room for their 
meeting, preferring the ―matrimonial room‖ as his first 
choice because it had a ―king size bed‖ in which the three 
of them would ―fit fine.‖  While awaiting their 
rendezvous, Pavulak ―reall[y] want[ed] to see pictures‖ 
of Duran and Jane Doe—a request that Duran obliged. 
 While Pavulak was in the Philippines, he visited 
several women he met online and spent time with Duran 
and Jane Doe.  He took photographs of Duran and Jane 
Doe, some of which depicted Duran or Pavulak nude or 
engaging in sexual activity.  He also recorded videos of 
his sexual activity with Duran, one of which portrays 
Duran performing oral sex on Pavulak.  That video, as 
Pavulak tells her, ―will be [Jane Doe‘s] training video‖ so 
Duran can ―show her how to [perform oral sex].‖ 
 During Pavulak‘s return to the United States, he 
sent Duran several text messages about including Jane 
Doe in their sexual activities.  He ―hope[d]‖ that Jane 
Doe would ―like it too‖; asked Duran to ―teach her 
everything‖; indicated he would perform oral sex on Jane 
Doe and instructed Duran to do so in the interim ―so she 
likes it‖;6 and wondered if Duran‘s ―really good‖ 
                                                 
6
 This text message remained in Pavulak‘s unsent 
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instruction of Jane Doe would allow Jane Doe to perform 
oral sex on Pavulak ―next December.‖  Pavulak believed 
that Duran could ―make it all work out for the three of 
[them]‖ to have a ―happy sex life.‖  Eager to see them 
again soon, Pavulak scheduled an online webcam chat 
with Duran for the morning of January 18. 
 That morning, Pavulak chatted with Duran using 
the laptop from the CTI office.  They discussed Jane 
Doe‘s involvement in their sexual activities.  We regret 
the need to recite in detail several of these ―chats,‖ but 
the content is necessary to some of the conclusions we 
reach in our discussion below. 
Duran:  I showed [Jane Doe] how to 
masturbate hon 
* * * 
Pavulak:  does she try to do it 
Pavulak:  if u play with her pussy a lot 
then by the time i get there she 
will want me to play with her 
Duran:  i caught her many times hon 
always playing with her pussy 
Pavulak:  i wish she would just spread her 
                                                                                                             
message folder. 
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legs and let me lick her 
Duran:  sometimes when I catch her 
playing her pussy, I spank her 
Pavulak:  why 
Pavulak:  u should encourage her 
Duran: shes so young playing with it 
Pavulak:  n o she is not 
Duran:  I think 5 will be better 
Duran:  5 years old 
Pavulak:  she plays with it because it 
feels good to her 
Pavulak:  [t]here is no age 
Pavulak:  on when 
Duran: her pussy now is very red 
Pavulak:  look up on the computer 
―young children masturbation‖ 
Pavulak:  and u will find articcles about it 
Duran: ok i will look up in the 
computer tomorrow hon 
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When Pavulak expressed ―hope‖ that he could see Jane 
Doe use a vibrator, Duran assured him that he would.  
Pavulak also hoped to engage in sexual activity with Jane 
Doe: 
 Pavulak:  u think i can finger fuck her at age 5 
 Duran:  well..just try hon 
 Duran:  just use ur small finger hon 
 Duran:  i think it will be fit to her pussy 
 Pavulak:  hope she likes to suck cock hon 
 Duran:  at age 8 she will know if ur cock taste  
   good or not 
* * * 
Pavulak:  im going to shoooot cum in her mouth 
at age three when i come back there 
Duran:  hehehehe 
 Pavulak:  u just tell her to suck it out of me hon 
* * * 
 Pavulak:  u just keep showing her the movie  
   how u suck me 
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 Pavulak:  so she will know 
He continued to insist that Duran show the training video 
to Jane Doe and ―tell [Jane Doe] that it feels so good to‖ 
perform oral sex.  Pavulak then tried to get Duran to 
display her and Jane Doe‘s vaginas via the webcam: 
 Pavulak:  take ur panties off hon and show me  
   ur pussy 
Duran:  i only show my pussy to u hon 
Pavulak:  well im waiting hon 
Duran:  not now hon 
Duran: tuesday 
Pavulak:  why 
Pavulak:  hehe 
Pavulak:  no now 
Duran:  i try 
Pavulak:  and [Jane Doe‘s] too 
* * * 
Pavulak:  nice thanks 
 Pavulak:  cum for me 
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 Pavulak:  hehe 
 Pavulak:  now [Jane Doe‘s] 
 Duran:  hehee 
 Duran:  diapers on 
 Pavulak:  oh 
 Duran:  u cant see [Jane Doe‘s] pussy 
 Pavulak:  well maybe sometime soon 
 Duran:  yup 
 Duran:  morning u can see her naked hon 
 Pavulak:  ok 
The Delaware State Police recovered these chat 
logs between Pavulak and Duran from the laptop 
computer.  In addition, the police discovered that twenty-
nine of the child pornography images and forty-two 
images of Pavulak and Duran were accessed and edited 
using Windows Photo Gallery between September 13, 
2007, and November 22, 2008.   
B. Procedural Background 
With the discovery of those chat logs in addition to 
the child-pornography images, the United States took 
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over Pavulak‘s prosecution.  In April 2009, the United 
States indicted Pavulak on five counts in the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware: (1) 
failing to update his registration as a sex offender in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); (2) possessing child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); 
(3) attempting to produce child pornography in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e); (4) attempting to coerce 
and entice a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); 
and (5) committing a felony offense involving a minor 
while registered as a sex offender in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2260A. 
 Before trial, Pavulak moved to suppress the 
evidence seized from the CTI office and his Yahoo! 
account.  He made two arguments: first, that the search 
warrants were not based on probable cause because they 
did not provide the magistrate
7
 with any details about 
what the alleged child-pornography images depicted, and 
second, that he was entitled to a hearing under Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978), to challenge the 
veracity of several facts alleged in the probable-cause 
affidavit.  The District Court denied his motion.  The 
Court concluded that there was probable cause, and even 
                                                 
7
 We use the term ―magistrate‖ generally, referring to any 
member of the state or federal judiciary authorized to 
issue warrants (though in this case, a state issuing 
authority). 
 16 
 
if there were not, the officers reasonably relied on the 
warrants in good faith.  The Court also denied Pavulak‘s 
request for a Franks hearing after determining that 
Pavulak did not make a substantial preliminary showing 
that any misstatements or omissions affected the 
probable-cause analysis. 
 Pavulak proceeded to trial in September 2010.  
After a six-day trial, the jury found him guilty on all 
counts.  In January 2011, Pavulak moved for a judgment 
of acquittal on all counts under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29 based on insufficient evidence.  In addition, 
Pavulak argued that Mack‘s and Riggs‘s trial testimony 
was inconsistent with the information they provided for 
the search-warrant affidavit.  And this inconsistency, 
according to Pavulak, justified a post-trial Franks hearing 
to challenge the veracity of Mack‘s and Riggs‘s tips in 
the affidavit, leaving the search warrants without 
probable cause and ultimately entitling Pavulak to a new 
trial under Rule 33.  The District Court denied these 
motions. 
 Pavulak‘s pre-sentence report (PSR) gave rise to 
several objections.  As to Pavulak‘s attempted-production 
conviction, the Probation Office advised that his prior 
Delaware convictions subjected him to mandatory life 
imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) as a repeat sex 
offender.  Pavulak objected to this recommendation, 
arguing that his maximum statutory sentence was fifty 
years and that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 
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(2000), thus required a jury to determine whether his 
prior Delaware convictions could justify any increase 
beyond that fifty-year maximum.  The District Court 
rejected that argument.  Because Pavulak‘s maximum 
sentence was life imprisonment, the Court reasoned that 
Apprendi did not apply.  Consequently, the District Court 
found that Pavulak‘s prior convictions triggered 
mandatory life imprisonment under § 3559(e) for his 
attempted-production conviction and sentenced him 
accordingly.  As to his other counts, the District Court 
sentenced Pavulak to a consecutive term of 120 months‘ 
imprisonment for committing a felony offense involving 
a minor while registered as a sex offender and 120 
months‘ imprisonment for the remaining counts to run 
concurrently with each other and the attempted-
production count. 
  Pavulak timely appealed both his convictions and 
life sentence.
8
 
II. 
 According to Pavulak, the affidavit submitted in 
support of the search-warrant applications did not 
establish probable cause because it lacked any details 
about what the alleged images of child pornography 
                                                 
8
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction over Pavulak‘s appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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depicted.  On appeal from the denial of a motion to 
suppress, we review a district court‘s factual findings for 
clear error, and we exercise de novo review over its 
application of the law to those factual findings.  United 
States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006).  Here, 
we cannot say that the affidavit provided a ―‗substantial 
basis‘ for the magistrate‘s conclusion that there was a 
‗fair probability‘‖ of evidence of child pornography in 
the CTI office and Pavulak‘s Yahoo! account at the time 
of the search.  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 
526 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983)).  But suppression is ultimately 
inappropriate because the officers relied on the warrants 
in good faith.   
 When faced with a warrant application to search 
for child pornography, a magistrate must be able to 
independently evaluate whether the contents of the 
alleged images meet the legal definition of child 
pornography.  New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 
874 n.5 (1986).  That can be accomplished in one of three 
ways: (1) the magistrate can personally view the images; 
(2) the search-warrant affidavit can provide a 
―sufficiently detailed description‖ of the images; or (3) 
the search-warrant application can provide some other 
facts that tie the images‘ contents to child pornography.  
United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 
2011); see also Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 527 (holding that 
probable cause supported a warrant where the affidavit 
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tied the images of child pornography to the defendant 
using his IP address, a ―fairly unique identifier[]‖).   
In this case, the search-warrant applications 
alleged that Pavulak was ―dealing in child pornography‖ 
in violation of 11 Del. Code § 1109.  That statute 
prohibits transmitting, receiving, and possessing 
depictions of ―a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act 
or the simulation of such an act.‖  11 Del. Code § 1109.  
A ―prohibited sexual act‖ includes a wide range of sexual 
activity, including ―nudity . . . depicted for the purpose of 
sexual gratification of any individual‖ who may view the 
depiction as well as ―lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or pubic area of any child.‖  Id. § 1103(e).   
To show that evidence of Pavulak‘s dealing in 
child pornography existed at the CTI office and in his 
Yahoo! account, the affidavit relied on three pieces of 
information.  First, Pavulak had two prior convictions for 
child molestation.  Second, the affidavit stated that Mack 
and Riggs had seen Pavulak ―viewing child 
pornography‖ of females between twelve and eighteen 
years old, though the affidavit did not provide any further 
details about what the images depicted.  Third, officers 
were able to corroborate Pavulak‘s ownership of the 
Yahoo! email account, his trip to the Philippines, and his 
presence at the CTI office. 
 Despite our ―great deference‖ to the magistrate‘s 
determination, Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, these pieces of 
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information do not establish probable cause to believe 
that the images contained child pornography.  The label 
―child pornography,‖ without more, does not present any 
facts from which the magistrate could discern a ―fair 
probability‖ that what is depicted in the images meets the 
statutory definition of child pornography and complies 
with constitutional limits.  The affidavit does not 
describe, for instance, whether the minors depicted in the 
images were nude or clothed or whether they were 
engaged in any ―prohibited sexual act‖ as defined by 
Delaware law.  As we said in Miknevich, that kind of 
―insufficiently detailed or conclusory description‖ of the 
images is not enough.  638 F.3d at 183.  Presented with 
just the label ―child pornography,‖ the most the 
magistrate could infer was that the affiant concluded that 
the images constitute child pornography.   
The problem with that inference is that identifying 
images as child pornography ―will almost always 
involve, to some degree, a subjective and conclusory 
determination on the part of the viewer,‖ and such 
―inherent subjectivity is precisely why the determination 
should be made by a judge,‖ not the affiant.  United 
States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2001).  
Otherwise, ―we might indeed transform the [magistrate] 
into little more than the cliché ‗rubber stamp.‘‖  Doe v. 
Goody, 361 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2004).  Other circuits 
agree that a probable-cause affidavit must contain more 
than the affiant‘s belief that an image qualifies as child 
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pornography.  United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 474 
(4th Cir. 2011) (holding that there was no probable cause 
where the affidavit did not provide ―anything more than a 
description of the photographs as depicting ―nude 
children‖); Brunette, 256 F.3d at 18 (holding that there 
was no probable cause where an affidavit involved an 
affiant‘s ―legal conclusion parroting the statutory 
definition‖ of child pornography ―absent any descriptive 
support and without an independent review of the 
images‖ by a magistrate). 
 The government cites several cases for the 
proposition that the label ―child pornography,‖ by itself, 
is sufficient.  All but one of those cases, however, fall far 
short of supporting the government‘s argument.  
Although the affidavits in Miknevich and Vosburgh did 
not describe the contents of the images, the 
circumstances of those cases required no such 
description.  In Miknevich, the affidavit identified the 
contents of the computer file as child pornography 
through a sexually explicit and highly descriptive file 
name referring to the ages of the children and implying 
that they were masturbating.  638 F.3d at 184.  The file‘s 
―digital fingerprint‖ also marked it as one known to 
contain child pornography.  Id. at 185.  We upheld that 
warrant, reasoning that the file name was ―explicit and 
detailed enough so as to permit a reasonable inference of 
what the file is likely to depict.‖  Id.  No such indication 
is present in this case. 
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Vosburgh involved a defendant who tried to 
download a link to a video described on the website as 
depicting a four-year-old performing oral sex—a video 
that contained only gibberish because it had been planted 
by law enforcement.  602 F.3d at 517.  The officer 
tracked the download attempt to the defendant‘s 
computer and obtained a warrant to search for child 
pornography.  Id.  We upheld that warrant because the 
defendant‘s deliberate attempt to download child 
pornography established a fair probability that he 
possessed other images of child pornography.  Id.  The 
probable-cause determination there, unlike this case, was 
not based on the affiant‘s knowledge that the defendant 
possessed child pornography, so there were no illicit 
depictions to describe in the affidavit.  Id.  So, too, in 
United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 
1998).  There, the affidavit described the defendant‘s 
agreement to ―send a computer diskette with numerous 
scenes of prepubescent children under the age of 
thirteen‖ to an undercover officer ―in exchange for a 
videotape containing scenes of child pornography.‖  Id. 
at 1246–47.  Finally, the government‘s reliance on 
United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 
2000), and United States v. Budd, 549 F.3d 1140 (7th Cir. 
2008), is unhelpful.  Those cases do not specify what 
information was presented in the affidavits. 
That leaves the government‘s position dependent 
entirely on United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627 (8th Cir. 
 23 
 
2007).  In Grant, the Eighth Circuit upheld a warrant to 
search for child pornography based on an officer‘s 
conclusion that images observed by an informant met the 
statutory definition of child pornography.  Id. at 630, 632.  
We decline to adopt the Eighth Circuit‘s approach.   
Magistrates—not affiants or officers—bear the 
responsibility of determining whether there exists a fair 
probability that the sought-after images meet the 
statutory and constitutional definitions of child 
pornography.  Cf. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. at 876–77 
(reviewing the search-warrant affidavit to ensure that the 
magistrate ―was given more than enough information to 
conclude that there was a fair probability that the movies 
satisfied the first and third elements of the statutory 
definition‖ of obscenity (emphasis added)).  In any event, 
we believe the Supreme Court‘s decision in P.J. Video, 
together with our own precedent in Vosburgh and 
Miknevich, compel us to require more than a conclusion 
by an affiant that the sought-after images constitute child 
pornography. 
 Nor does combining the label ―child pornography‖ 
with the rest of the information in the affidavit produce 
something greater than the sum of its parts.  Pavulak‘s 
prior child-molestation convictions are ―not sufficient to 
establish—or even to hint at—probable cause as to the 
wholly separate crime of possessing child pornography‖ 
absent any allegation of a correlation between the two 
types of crimes.  Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 
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419 (3d Cir. 2011).  That correlation between the two 
crimes is the missing linchpin that differentiates this case 
from the Eighth Circuit‘s decision in United States v. 
Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577–78 (8th Cir. 2010).  There, 
the defendant was ―pushing a five-year-old girl (whom 
he did not know) on a playground swingset while talking 
to her ‗about movies‘ and videos the man had at his 
home.‘‖  John, 654 F.3d at 422 (describing Colbert, 605 
F.3d at 575).  Based on that information, officers 
obtained a warrant to search his home for child 
pornography.  Colbert, 605 F.3d at 575–76.  The Eighth 
Circuit upheld the warrant, concluding that the 
combination of the defendant‘s ―specific desire to watch 
movies at home with an unrelated five-year-old girl‖ and 
his ―contemporaneous attempt to entice‖ her established 
probable cause to believe those movies contained child 
pornography.  Id.  By contrast, Detective Skubik‘s 
affidavit did not link Pavulak‘s prior acts of child 
molestation to the sought-after images.  See John, 654 
F.3d at 422 (distinguishing Colbert on this basis).  His 
criminal history thus does not provide any additional 
reason to believe that these specific images met the legal 
definition of child pornography under Delaware law. 
 Likewise, the successful corroboration of certain 
details about Pavulak‘s other activities does not save the 
warrants.  To be sure, a ―‗tip conveying a 
contemporaneous observation of criminal activity whose 
innocent details are corroborated‘‖ can establish probable 
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cause of that criminal activity.  United States v. Torres, 
534 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States 
v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 735 (8th Cir. 2001)).  But the 
details corroborated in this case—Pavulak‘s email 
account, his trip to the Philippines, and residence and 
employment at the CTI office—did not increase the 
likelihood that the sought-after images contained 
lascivious depictions of nude minors or minors engaging 
in sexual acts prohibited by Delaware law.  As a result, 
the label ―child pornography‖—without any details about 
what the images depict or any other connection to child 
pornography—is beyond the outer limits of probable-
cause territory. 
 Even though the warrants in this case transgressed 
that boundary, the evidence should not be suppressed 
because the officers relied on the warrant in good faith.  
Suppression is not justified when officers act in the 
―reasonable belief that their conduct d[oes] not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.‖  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 918 (1984).  ―Ordinarily, the ‗mere existence of a 
warrant . . . suffices to prove that an officer conducted a 
search in good faith.‘‖  United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 
540, 561 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Hodge, 
246 F.3d 301, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Yet there are 
situations ―in which, although a neutral magistrate has 
found probable cause to search, a lay officer executing 
the warrant could not reasonably believe that the 
magistrate was correct.‖  Id.  Those four ―rare 
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circumstances‖ occur when: 
(1) the magistrate issued the warrant in 
reliance on a deliberately or recklessly 
false affidavit; 
(2) the magistrate abandoned his judicial 
role and failed to perform his neutral 
and detached function; 
(3) the warrant was based on an affidavit 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable; or 
(4) the warrant was so facially deficient 
that it failed to particularize the place 
to be searched or the things to be 
seized. 
Id. at 561 & n.19 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Here, Pavulak invokes only the third 
exception—that the affidavit was ―so lacking in indicia 
of probable cause as to render‖ the executing officers‘ 
belief unreasonable.
9
 
                                                 
9
 To the extent Pavulak intends to invoke the first 
exception to good faith—that the magistrate issued the 
warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false 
affidavit—by arguing that he was entitled to a Franks 
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 The ―threshold for establishing this exception is a 
high one,‖ Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 
1245 (2012), and Pavulak has not overcome that burden  
here.  The affidavit in this case is not a ―bare bones‖ 
affidavit.  It does not rely on an officer‘s unsupported 
belief that probable cause exists.  See United States v. 
Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Gates, 
462 U.S. at 239 (identifying the affidavits in Nathanson 
v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), and Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), as ―bare bones‖ affidavits 
because each contained only an officer‘s belief that 
probable cause existed without providing any factual 
details).  It does not rely on a single piece of stale 
evidence.  See United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 
426, 437 (3d Cir. 2002).  And it does not rely on an 
uncorroborated or unreliable anonymous tip.  See United 
States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 Rather, the affiant (also one of the executing 
officers) knew that the affidavit had been prepared using 
first-hand information from Mack, a fellow employee 
who provided reliable and current knowledge of 
Pavulak‘s activities at the CTI office—information that 
was confirmed by another employee, Riggs.  The affiant 
also knew that some of the information Mack and Riggs 
provided had been corroborated and that this information 
                                                                                                             
hearing, we reject that argument for the reasons set forth 
in Parts III and VI. 
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had been circulated in a police memorandum and 
reviewed before the warrants were sought.  In short, the 
officers reasonably relied on the warrant even though the 
supporting affidavit did not contain details about the 
content of the images. 
 And their reliance on the warrant despite the lack 
of those details is defensible in light of ―the state of 
Circuit law at the time.‖  Hodge, 246 F.3d at 309.  The 
warrants were sought and issued in 2009, but the cases 
leading us to conclude that the affidavit was 
insufficient—Vosburgh, John, and Miknevich—were not 
decided until 2010 and 2011.  In fact, the affidavit‘s 
allegations would have been sufficient in the Eighth 
Circuit at the time.  See Grant, 490 F.3d at 630, 632 
(upholding a search warrant based on an officer‘s 
conclusion that a witness‘s description of the images met 
the definition of child pornography under the state 
statute). 
 Pavulak counters that the good-faith exception is 
inapplicable because the affiant, Detective Skubik, was 
also involved in executing the search.  That is not the 
law.  To be sure, we have acknowledged that it is 
―somewhat disingenuous‖ to find good faith based on a 
―paltry showing‖ of probable cause, ―particularly where 
the affiant is also one of the executing officers.‖  
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 438.  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court has observed that an officer who both prepared the 
search-warrant application and carried out the search was 
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familiar enough with the warrant to have noticed its 
deficiency upon ―even a cursory reading‖ or ―just a 
simple glance.‖  Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 
(2004).  Those observations, however, simply reinforce 
the longstanding rule that ―paltry‖ affidavits preclude 
good faith.  Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has 
created a new exception to good faith based entirely on 
the identity of the executing officer, and Pavulak fails to 
cite any court that has interpreted the Supreme Court‘s 
observation in Groh so broadly.  The officers reasonably 
relied on the warrants in good faith and the District Court 
correctly denied Pavulak‘s motion to suppress. 
III. 
 Pavulak also claims that the District Court erred by 
denying his request for a pre-trial Franks hearing.  The 
Fourth Amendment prohibits the intentional or reckless 
inclusion of a material false statement (or omission of 
material information) in a search-warrant affidavit.  
United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383–84 (3d Cir. 
2006).  In Franks, the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant may be entitled to challenge the truthfulness of 
facts alleged in support of a search-warrant application.  
Franks, 438 U.S. at 164–65.  The right to a Franks 
hearing is not absolute, however.  The defendant must 
first (1) make a ―substantial preliminary showing‖ that 
the affiant knowingly or recklessly included a false 
statement in or omitted facts from the affidavit, and (2) 
demonstrate that the false statement or omitted facts are 
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―necessary to the finding of probable cause.‖  Yusuf, 461 
F.3d at 383–84.   
We have not yet identified the standard of review 
for a district court‘s denial of a request for a Franks 
hearing, and our sister circuits are divided on the correct 
approach.
10
  See United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 
                                                 
10
 The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits employ a mixed 
standard, reviewing legal determinations de novo and any 
supporting factual findings for clear error.  See United 
States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Martin, 332 F.3d 827, 833 (5th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 979 (9th 
Cir. 2002).  By contrast, the First, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits review a district court‘s decision for clear error, 
though it is unclear to what extent that clear-error review 
maps onto the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits‘ mixed 
standard.    See United States v. Smith, 576 F.3d 762, 764 
(7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 14 
(1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 
304 (6th Cir. 2002).  The Second Circuit has apparently 
sided with mixed review, though then-Judge Sotomayor 
questioned the validity of that choice.  Compare United 
States v. Cahill, 355 F. App‘x 563, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(reviewing factual findings supporting the denial of a 
Franks hearing for clear error), and United States v. One 
Parcel of Property Located at 15 Black Ledge, 897 F.2d 
97, 100 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), with United States v. 
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126 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing split); United States 
v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 
United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 843–44 n.44 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (per curiam)) (same).  We conclude that this 
case does not require us to enter the fray.  Even under de 
novo review, none of the alleged errors identified by 
Pavulak would have changed the probable-cause 
determination. 
Pavulak first says the affidavit omitted crucial 
information: although indicating that his prior Delaware 
convictions occurred in 1998 and 2005, the affidavit did 
                                                                                                             
Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 126 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(Sotomayor, J.) (questioning the propriety of clear-error 
review and noting that the Second Circuit has not 
―explain[ed] why that was the appropriate standard‖).  
Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit has carved its own path, 
reviewing the district court‘s decision for abuse of 
discretion.  See United States v. Kattaria, 553 F.3d 1171, 
1177 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam).  The 
Eleventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit have not yet decided 
what standard to use.  See United States v. Becton, 601 
F.3d 588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (bypassing the need to 
adopt a standard); United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 
1191, 1219 n.37 (11th Cir. 2009) (same, though noting 
that a district court‘s decision to deny an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion to suppress is normally reviewed for 
abuse of discretion). 
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not explain that the conduct underlying both of those 
convictions occurred between 1997 and 1999.  This half-
truth, Pavulak says, was ―calculated to portray [him] as a 
persistent threat‖ even though ―at the time of the 
affidavit[,] he had not committed an offense for roughly 
10 years.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 50.  Yet when we add this 
counterfactual information to the affidavit, it does not 
change our probable-cause determination.  Yusuf, 461 
F.3d at 388 n.12 (―The omitted information is introduced 
into the affidavit in order to determine whether the 
omission was material.‖).  As we concluded earlier, 
Pavulak‘s prior convictions of child molestation did not 
establish probable cause for the ―wholly separate crime 
of possessing child pornography.‖  John, 654 F.3d at 
419; see supra Part II.  Given that the convictions 
themselves do not change either the reasonableness or 
probable-cause determinations, when his underlying 
conduct occurred is similarly irrelevant.  Consequently, 
Pavulak has failed to show that ―there would have been 
no probable cause but for‖ the omission of when his prior 
conduct occurred.  See United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 
737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The false statements Pavulak identifies are no 
more availing.  He challenges paragraph 4 of the 
affidavit, which stated that Pavulak was viewing child 
pornography in October 2008 in CTI‘s office ―located at 
270 Quigley Blvd, New Castle DE 19720.‖  According to 
Pavulak, CTI‘s office was in Newport, Delaware, at that 
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time and did not relocate to New Castle until later that 
month.  See Appellant‘s Br. at 51.  That mistake, though, 
does not undermine the existence of probable cause.
11
  
The import of that information was that Pavulak was 
viewing child pornography in CTI‘s only office—
wherever it was located—using CTI‘s computers and 
using his online Yahoo! account.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 934 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that inclusion of an ―innocent error‖ about the 
defendant‘s address in the affidavit was insufficient to 
satisfy the defendant‘s burden under Franks).  This 
alleged misstatement did not meet Pavulak‘s burden. 
 Finally, the officers‘ internal memorandum stated 
that Pavulak ―molested the daughter of his Russian 
wife‖—a statement Pavulak claims is false because his 
Russian wife did not have a daughter.  See Appellant‘s 
Br. at 52.  Using this statement to challenge the search 
warrant, however, turns Franks on its head.  The internal 
memorandum was not submitted in support of the search-
warrant application, and this statement about a daughter 
of his Russian wife was not mentioned in the probable-
cause affidavit.  See Oral Arg. Tr. at 8, 38.  If Franks 
means anything, it means that the Fourth Amendment is 
not violated when officers choose to omit information of 
questionable veracity from their search-warrant 
                                                 
11
 Pavulak does not argue that the warrant authorized or 
resulted in a search of the wrong location. 
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applications.  That is precisely what Franks encourages 
and exactly what the officers did here.  In sum, Pavulak 
was not entitled to a pre-trial Franks hearing. 
IV. 
 Pavulak further claims that the prosecutor‘s 
closing argument denied him due process.  Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).  To determine 
if that is true, we must ―weigh the prosecutor‘s conduct, 
the effect of the curative instructions and the strength of 
the evidence.‖  Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
182 (1986)).  Where, as here, the defendant did not object 
to the alleged misconduct, we review the prosecutor‘s 
statements for plain error.  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 
170, 193 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 Although Pavulak complains that three of the 
prosecutor‘s statements infected his trial, we detect no 
fatal infirmity.  First, Pavulak claims that the prosecutor 
improperly relied on his four-day trip to Las Vegas as the 
basis for the failure-to-update charge.  That argument 
mischaracterizes the record. To prove that Pavulak 
violated the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act (―SORNA‖) by failing to update his registration, the 
prosecutor had to show that Pavulak (1) was a sex 
offender required to register under SORNA who (2) 
traveled in interstate or foreign commerce after 
SORNA‘s enactment and (3) knowingly failed to update 
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his sex-offender registration as required by SORNA.  See 
United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)).  After pointing out 
Pavulak‘s status as a sex offender (the first element), the 
prosecutor relied on Pavulak‘s trips to Las Vegas and the 
Philippines to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement (the 
second element).  The prosecutor then turned to the third 
element, relying on Pavulak‘s failure to update his 
registration while living in and employed at the CTI 
office.  See JA616a (―Now, the problem for the defendant 
is that he never registered that address, that CTI address, 
as either a place of employment or a place that he was 
living.‖ (emphasis added)); see JA615a–31a (arguing that 
Pavulak was living and working at the CTI office).  The 
prosecutor thus argued that Pavulak‘s time at the CTI 
office, not his Las Vegas trip, required him to update his 
SORNA registration. 
 Second, the prosecutor‘s momentary focus on the 
―big picture‖ did not improperly invite the jury to 
cumulate the evidence of the separate charges.  The 
prosecutor began his closing argument by telling the jury 
that Pavulak had been charged with ―four different 
crimes‖ and then discussed the law and evidence for each 
count separately.  See JA612a, 614a (inviting the jury to 
―walk through the charges and the evidence that proves 
the defendant guilty of each of them‖); see id. (discussing 
Count 1); SA300 (discussing Count 4), 321 (discussing 
Count 3), 325–26 (discussing Count 2).  As he was 
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wrapping up, the prosecutor made the following 
comment: 
The other thing you see in the presentation 
from the defense is a divide and conquer 
strategy.  They take four different crimes 
and they want to separate them and they 
want you to look at each one with blinders 
on.  They don‘t want you to look at the big 
picture, because the big picture, folks, is 
really ugly for Mr. Pavulak.  Same [modus 
operandi]. 
Although this comment is where Pavulak places the 
weight of his improper-cumulation argument, this 
comment cannot shoulder that load.  Such a single, 
ambiguous remark—ameliorated by our presumption that 
the jury followed its instruction to consider the evidence 
for each charge separately, see United States v. Edmonds, 
80 F.3d 810, 825 (3d Cir. 1996), and the overwhelming 
evidence against Pavulak on each count—cannot 
constitute plain error.  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 
312, 339 (3d Cir. 2010) (―The type of counsel 
misconduct that warrants granting a new trial is not 
generally a single isolated inappropriate comment, but 
rather repeated conduct that ‗permeate[s]‘ the trial.‖ 
(citation omitted)); see also United States v. Brown, 254 
F.3d 454, 465 (3d Cir. 2001) (―[A] court should not 
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous 
remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, 
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sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that 
meaning from the plethora of less damaging 
interpretations.‖ (citation omitted)). 
Third, the prosecutor‘s discussion of the harm 
caused by production of child pornography was 
unobjectionable.  The prosecutor stated: 
As the thousands of images of child 
pornography on defendant‘s computers 
prove, physical and digital images can live 
on indefinitely.  And think about the story 
behind each of those pictures. 
The day before he was arrested, the 
defendant tried to have [Duran] put [Jane 
Doe] on the Webcam, exposing her vagina.  
He could have [recorded] that image, 
Detective Willey told us.  If so, we‘d have 
yet another image of child pornography, 
another file that memorializes the actual 
sexual abuse of a real child, and the story in 
this case, the story that you heard last week, 
would lie behind that image forever, because 
each image memorializes the sexual 
exploitation of an actual child.  That‘s why 
Congress has banned any person from 
producing, distributing, receiving, or 
possessing an image of child pornography. 
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These statements parallel Congress‘s reasons for 
criminalizing the production and attempted production of 
child pornography.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2251.  Besides, this 
explanation preempted Pavulak‘s argument that Jane 
Doe‘s brief nudity on a webcam would not have 
meaningfully harmed her.  See R. 84 at 80; Appellant‘s 
Br. at 46 (calling Pavulak‘s actions ―minor, to the point 
of approaching triviality‖).  In short, none of the 
prosecutor‘s remarks constitute plain error.  
V. 
Pavulak also challenges whether the District Court 
erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal 
based on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
attempted-production and possession convictions.
12
  We 
review a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim de novo.  
United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d 
Cir. 2005)).  In doing so, we ―‗examine the totality of the 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial,‘ and ‗interpret 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government as the verdict winner.‘‖  United States v. 
Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60, 62 (3d Cir. 
2008)).  If ―all the pieces of evidence, taken together, 
make a strong enough case to let a jury find [the 
                                                 
12
 On appeal, Pavulak does not challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence supporting his remaining convictions. 
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defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then we 
must uphold the jury‘s verdict.‖  Brodie, 403 F.2d at 134 
(quoting United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 
(3d Cir. 1987)). 
Here, Pavulak‘s challenge to his conviction for 
knowingly possessing child pornography falls short of its 
―extremely high‖ burden.  Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206 
(quoting United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2008)).  To prove possession of child pornography 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), the evidence must 
show that Pavulak ―knowingly possesse[d], or knowingly 
accesse[d] with an intent to view, any book, magazine, 
periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other 
material that contains an image of child pornography‖ 
with the requisite connection to interstate commerce.  
Pavulak concedes that the images recovered from the 
laptop
13
 depict child pornography.  But he argues that no 
rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he knowingly possessed those images.  See 
Appellant‘s Br. at 33–37.   
The jury, though, had ample evidence to infer 
otherwise.  The laptop had only a single password-
protected Windows user account and contained photos of 
                                                 
13
 Because the jury‘s verdict can be sustained based on 
the evidence relating to the laptop, we do not address 
whether the evidence relating to the desktop computer 
withstands Pavulak‘s sufficiency challenge.  
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Pavulak, Pavulak claimed that the laptop was his 
computer, and the police recovered the laptop from the 
part of the CTI office in which he was living.  Simply 
put, Pavulak was the laptop‘s likeliest user. 
And Pavulak was also the likeliest person to have 
accessed the child-pornography images on the laptop.  
They were not buried away where an innocent user could 
have overlooked them.  Twenty-nine of them were found 
in Windows Photo Gallery, which could have occurred 
only if the user had accessed the image and modified it in 
some way.  And the laptop‘s user edited the twenty-nine 
images between September and November 2008, usually 
in the evening and on the weekends—when Pavulak had 
access to the laptop and other CTI employees did not.  
Indeed, on two occasions, several of the child-
pornography images and pictures of Pavulak were edited 
within hours of each other.  Compare Gov‘t Exs. 246–50, 
253–54 (depicting images of Pavulak created on 
September 13, 2008 at approximately 3:30 p.m.), with 
Gov‘t Exs. 225–225A (depicting an image of child 
pornography created on September 13, 2008 at 
approximately 11:30 p.m.); compare Gov‘t Ex. 251 
(depicting an image of Pavulak created on November 4, 
2008 at approximately 5:20 p.m.), with Gov‘t Exs. 211–
211A, 215–216A, 219–220A, 228–228A, 231–231A 
(depicting images of child pornography created on 
November 4, 2008 at approximately 10:40 p.m.).  By 
contrast, no one accessed these twenty-nine images of 
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child pornography when Pavulak left the laptop in the 
United States during his trip to the Philippines.  The 
weight of this evidence prevents us from overturning 
Pavulak‘s conviction for possessing child pornography. 
Likewise, we cannot say that ―‗no reasonable juror 
could accept the evidence as sufficient‘‖ to find Pavulak 
guilty of attempting to produce child pornography.  
Miller, 527 F.3d at 69 (quoting United States v. Lacy, 
446 F.3d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 2006)).  The crime of attempt 
requires the specific intent to commit a crime—here, 
producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(a)—and a substantial step towards the 
commission of that crime.  Cf. United States v. Nestor, 
574 F.3d 159, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing 
attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual 
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)).  Under 
§ 2251(a), a person is guilty of producing child 
pornography if he ―employs, uses, persuades, induces, 
entices, or coerces any minor to engage in‖ or ―has a 
minor assist any other person to engage in . . . any 
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing 
any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of 
transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct.‖   
Here, Pavulak repeatedly insisted that Duran 
display Jane Doe‘s vagina via a live webcam feed during 
their January 18, 2009 chat session.  See JA530a–31a 
(telling Duran to ―take ur panties off hon and show me ur 
pussy,‖ stating ―no now . . . and [Jane Doe’s] too‖ when 
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Duran initially declined, and again demanding ―now 
[Jane Doe’s]‖ after Duran gave in to his request to see 
her vagina (emphasis added)).  Duran declined to expose 
Jane Doe‘s vagina because she was wearing a diaper but 
offered to display Jane Doe naked the next morning.  
Pavulak agreed, typing ―ok.‖  That evidence was enough 
to constitute a substantial step towards ―coercing‖ Jane 
Doe to ―engage in any sexually explicit conduct . . . for 
the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such 
conduct.‖  18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); see, e.g., United States v. 
Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 918 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding a 
guilty verdict for attempted production of child 
pornography where the evidence showed that the 
defendant ―repeatedly . . . request[ed] sexually explicit 
photographs and [sent] a photograph of his own‖). 
Moreover, there was plenty of evidence that 
Pavulak specifically intended for Duran to display Jane 
Doe‘s vagina ―to excite lustfulness or sexual 
stimulation.‖  See United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 
745 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that ―lascivious exhibition 
of genitals or pubic area‖ is ―one variety of ‗sexually 
explicit conduct‘ proscribed by the statute‖).  During that 
chat, Pavulak described various ways that he intended to 
sexually abuse Jane Doe in the future, including: 
 Digitally penetrating her at age five; 
 Hoping that she likes performing oral sex on 
him; 
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 Wanting to see her use a vibrator; 
 Ejaculating in her mouth during his next trip 
to the Philippines; and 
 Wanting Duran to continue instructing Jane 
Doe on how to perform oral sex. 
Pavulak‘s text messages and the ―training video‖ confirm 
his desires.  His own text messages to Duran indicate that 
Pavulak wanted to perform oral sex on Jane Doe, to see 
both Duran and Jane Doe ―naked on the cam using the 
v[i]brator,‖ to have Jane Doe perform oral sex on him, 
and to have Duran ―make it all work out for the three of 
[them] to be [sic] happy sex life.‖  And Pavulak created a 
―training video‖ for Jane Doe to learn how to perform 
oral sex. 
Urging us to characterize his chat with Duran as 
facetious ―banter,‖ Pavulak claims that he lacked the 
specific intent ―to act on any of the illicit portions of his 
fantasies.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 30.  Yet ―‗it is not for us to 
weigh the evidence.‘‖  United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 
473, 478 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Dent, 
149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)).  And even if that were 
one plausible interpretation of the evidence, his 
―‗contention that the evidence also permits a less sinister 
conclusion‘‖ than guilt is not enough to overturn the 
verdict.  Id. (quoting Dent, 149 F.3d at 188).  Pavulak 
fails to take the next step and explain why the 
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government‘s ample evidence does not support the jury‘s 
verdict.  The jury therefore had sufficient evidence to 
find that Pavulak specifically intended to produce child 
pornography by directing Duran to expose Jane Doe on 
the webcam.  As a result, Pavulak‘s sufficiency 
challenges fail. 
VI. 
 The District Court did not err by denying 
Pavulak‘s motion for a new trial.  According to Pavulak, 
Mack testified at trial that he saw Pavulak viewing adult 
pornography, contradicting the search-warrant affidavit‘s 
indication that he saw Pavulak viewing child 
pornography.  This inconsistency, Pavulak contends, 
entitled him to a post-trial Franks hearing so he could 
show that the affidavit‘s information was false.  In turn, 
that falsity would justify suppression of the chat logs, 
photographs, and other evidence recovered from the CTI 
office and his Yahoo! account and ultimately entitle him 
to a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
33.   
 We normally review the denial of a Rule 33 
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.  See United 
States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Because Pavulak predicates his motion for a new trial on 
his entitlement to a Franks hearing, we will directly 
evaluate the denial of his request for a post-trial Franks 
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hearing.  Accord United States v. Rivera, 410 F.3d 998, 
1000–01 (8th Cir. 2005) (taking this approach).  He was 
entitled to such a hearing only if he (1) made a 
―substantial preliminary showing‖ that the affiant 
knowingly or recklessly included a false statement in or 
omitted facts from the affidavit, and (2) showed that the 
false statements or omitted facts were ―necessary to the 
finding of probable cause.‖  Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383–84.  
Like his request for a pre-trial Franks hearing, we need 
not establish a standard of review because Pavulak was 
not entitled to a post-trial Franks hearing under any 
standard. 
 Mack‘s trial testimony was perfectly consistent 
with the information he provided for the search-warrant 
affidavit.  At trial, Mack testified that pictures of women 
Pavulak met in the Philippines—not the suspected 
images of child pornography—―looked of age.‖  Indeed, 
at trial, Mack confirmed that the pornographic images to 
which he tipped off the police involved ―really young‖ 
girls in their ―early teens.‖  With no inconsistency 
between Mack‘s trial testimony and earlier tip, Pavulak 
cannot make the ―substantial preliminary showing‖ that 
the information provided in the affidavit was false.  And 
without identifying false information, Pavulak was not 
entitled to a post-trial Franks hearing and, consequently, 
to a new trial. 
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VII. 
 In addition to challenging his convictions, Pavulak 
claims that the Constitution required the jury, not the 
District Court, to determine the facts that triggered his 
mandatory life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(1) on 
the attempted-production conviction.  We exercise de 
novo review over these questions of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation.  United States v. Barbosa, 271 
F.3d 438, 452 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. 
Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 861 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
First, some background: Section 3559(e)(1) 
imposes a mandatory life sentence on a defendant 
―convicted of a Federal sex offense in which a minor is 
the victim‖ if he has a ―prior sex conviction in which a 
minor was the victim.‖  The trigger for this section—a 
―prior sex conviction in which a child was the victim‖—
includes specified ―Federal sex offense[s]‖ as well as 
―State sex offense[s]‖ that would be ―punishable by more 
than one year in prison‖ and involve ―conduct that would 
be a Federal sex offense‖ if there were federal 
jurisdiction.  18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(2)(A)–(B).   
Thus, determining whether § 3559(e)(1)‘s 
mandatory life sentence applies to Pavulak turns on 
whether his prior Delaware convictions for unlawful 
sexual contact in the second degree under 11 Del. Code 
§ 768 also constitute a federal sex offense—here, 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 2241(c).  To make that determination, we must start 
with the formal categorical approach.  That inquiry 
requires a district judge to evaluate whether the 
―elements of the statutory state offense,‖ not ―the specific 
facts‖ underlying the defendant‘s prior conviction, would 
automatically constitute a federal sex offense.  Jean-
Louis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 465 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Here, the Delaware crime of unlawful sexual 
contact in the second degree is not necessarily congruous 
with the federal crime of aggravated sexual abuse of 
children under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c).  There are at least 
two differences: 
1. Section 2241(c) requires the victim to be less 
than twelve years old, whereas 11 Del. Code 
§ 768 requires the victim to be less than 
eighteen years old. 
2. Section 2241(c) contains an additional 
element—a specific-intent requirement that the 
defendant‘s ―intentional touching‖ occur ―with 
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, 
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person‖—that 11 Del. Code. § 768 does not 
require.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D) 
(defining ―sexual act‖ to include this specific-
intent requirement), with 11 Del. Code § 761(f) 
(defining ―sexual act‖ without any specific-
intent requirement). 
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Given these differences, the Delaware law under 
which Pavulak was previously convicted does not 
necessarily ―involve conduct that would be a Federal sex 
offense‖ under the formal categorical approach.  See, 
e.g., Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(reaching the same conclusion in comparing the 
Delaware crime of unlawful sexual contact in the third 
degree with the federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor 
because the federal crime required a victim under twelve 
years old while the Delaware crime did not contain an 
age cut-off).  Consequently, we cannot conclude, as a 
matter of law, that Pavulak‘s prior state convictions 
necessarily constitute a federal sex offense. 
 Our inquiry does not end there: the trier of fact 
might find sufficient facts underlying Pavulak‘s prior 
Delaware convictions to satisfy the two additional 
requirements of the federal crime of aggravated abuse of 
children. Who—the judge or the jury—is allowed to 
engage in that fact-finding?  Under the familiar Apprendi 
rule, the Fifth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause and 
Sixth Amendment‘s Jury Trial Guarantee require ―any 
fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum [to] be submitted to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  United States v. 
Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).   
If Apprendi applies, the district judge is usually 
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limited to the formal categorical approach, and any 
remaining elements of the federal sentencing 
enhancement must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In some cases (like this one) where the 
federal sentencing enhancement ―invites inquiry into the 
underlying facts of the case,‖ Borrome v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 687 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2012), we have modified 
the categorical approach, permitting the district judge to 
―evaluate whether the factual elements of the analogous 
federal crime were necessarily proven at the time of the 
defendant‘s conviction on the state charges.‖  United 
States v. Rood, 679 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying 
the modified categorical approach to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3559(e)); see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) (focusing on whether 
the state sex offense involves ―conduct that would be a 
Federal sex offense‖ and thereby inviting an inquiry into 
the facts underlying the defendant‘s conviction (emphasis 
added)).  Under this modified categorical approach, the 
judge may consider only those facts that were 
―necessarily admitted‖ by the defendant in his prior 
criminal proceeding—that is, facts found in the ―charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea 
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial 
judge to which the defendant assented.‖  Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).  On the other 
hand, if Apprendi does not apply, then the district judge 
is free to make any factual findings related to sentencing, 
just as he is when finding facts that trigger enhancements 
under the Sentencing Guidelines that would not increase 
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the defendant‘s maximum statutory sentence.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (holding that Apprendi does not limit a district 
court‘s ability to engage in judicial fact-finding within 
the permissible sentencing range so long as that fact-
finding would not trigger an increase in the defendant‘s 
maximum statutory sentence).   
Here, Apprendi‘s restriction on judicial fact-
finding does not apply because the mandatory life 
sentence in § 3559(e) does not exceed Pavulak‘s 
maximum statutory sentence for attempted production of 
child pornography, which is life imprisonment.  For 
attempted production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(e) establishes three sets of sentencing ranges 
depending on the defendant‘s criminal history.  A 
defendant with no qualifying prior convictions faces 
fifteen to thirty years‘ imprisonment.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(e).  A defendant faces twenty-five to fifty years‘ 
imprisonment if he has one prior conviction under certain 
federal laws or ―under the laws of any State relating to 
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual 
contact involving a minor or ward, or sex trafficking of 
children, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, 
sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child 
pornography.‖  Id.  Lastly, a defendant faces 
imprisonment between thirty-five years and life if he has 
two or more prior convictions under certain federal laws 
―or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual 
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exploitation of children.‖  Id. 
 Although Pavulak concedes that his two prior 
Delaware convictions subjected him to a sentencing 
range of twenty-five to fifty years, he contends that they 
did not ―relat[e] to the sexual exploitation of children‖ 
and therefore did not subject him to life imprisonment.  
And because § 3559(e)‘s mandatory life imprisonment 
would exceed his statutory maximum of fifty years under 
§ 2251(e), Pavulak concludes that Apprendi required the 
jury (not the District Court) to determine whether his 
Delaware convictions triggered the mandatory life 
sentence in § 3559(e). 
 Pavulak‘s premise is faulty.  His two prior 
Delaware convictions did ―relat[e] to the sexual 
exploitation of children,‖ subjecting him to a statutory 
maximum of life imprisonment under § 2251(e).  That 
conclusion is mandated by our decision in United States 
v. Randolph, 364 F.3d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 2004).  There, 
the defendant had three prior Georgia convictions for 
child molestation—defined as performing ―any immoral 
or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child 
under the age of 14 years with the intent to arouse or 
satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the 
person.‖  Id. at 122 (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2019 
(1978)).  After being convicted of attempted production 
of child pornography under a previous version of § 2251, 
the defendant faced an increased statutory maximum if 
his prior Georgia convictions involved the ―sexual 
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exploitation of children‖—the same framework as the 
current version of § 2251.  See id. at 119.  He argued that 
this enhancement applied only if the conduct underlying 
his prior convictions ―involv[ed] the production of visual 
depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct.‖  Id. at 122.  We rejected that case-by-case 
analysis and depiction-limited definition.  Instead, we 
adopted a categorical approach focused on whether the 
statutory definition of the prior crime, rather than the 
particular defendant‘s conduct, related to the ―sexual 
exploitation of children.‖  Id.  And Georgia‘s law against 
child molestation, we concluded, related to the ―sexual 
exploitation of children.‖  Id. 
 Likewise, Pavulak‘s two prior Delaware 
convictions for unlawful sexual contact in the second 
degree involved the ―sexual exploitation of children.‖  
Under Delaware law, ―[a] person is guilty of unlawful 
sexual contact in the second degree when the person 
intentionally has sexual contact with another person who 
is less than 16 years of age or causes the victim to have 
sexual contact with the person or a third person.‖  11 Del. 
Code § 768.  ―Sexual contact‖ is one type of ―sexual 
exploitation.‖  See Randolph, 364 F.3d at 122 (holding 
that ―child molestation‖ is related to sexual exploitation); 
United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572, 583 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that ―sexual exploitation‖ in § 2251(e) includes 
―involuntary deviate sexual intercourse‖ and ―statutory 
rape‖); see id. (holding that the definition of the prior 
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conviction need not ―contain the term ‗sexual 
exploitation of children‘‖ to qualify).  And because 
section 768 requires a victim who is ―less than 16 years 
of age,‖ the statute is limited to ―the sexual exploitation 
of children‖ as required by § 2251(e) (emphasis added). 
 Pavulak urges us to adopt the same case-by-case 
approach that we rejected in Randolph—a proposal we 
are powerless to consider.  See Mariana v. Fisher, 338 
F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2003) (―[T]he holding of a panel 
in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels.‖ (quoting Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1)).   
 And contrary to Pavulak‘s insistence otherwise, 
Congress‘s amendments to § 2251(e) since Randolph do 
not change anything.  At the time of Randolph, 
§ 2251(e)‘s enhanced sentencing ranges were both 
triggered by prior state convictions ―relating to the sexual 
exploitation of children‖: twenty-five to fifty years for 
one such conviction and thirty-five years to life for two 
such convictions.  See Randolph, 364 F.3d at 119.  In 
2006, Congress amended the description of qualifying 
state offenses that would trigger the twenty-five-to-fifty-
year category: it replaced ―the sexual exploitation of 
children‖ with ―aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, 
abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward, or sex 
trafficking of children, or the production, possession, 
receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or 
transportation of child pornography.‖  Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
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109-248, § 206(b)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 587, 614 (2006).  But 
Congress did not make any changes to the thirty-five-to-
life category under which Pavulak was sentenced—
meaning that state laws ―related to the sexual exploitation 
of children‖ remained a trigger for that sentencing range.  
See id.   
 Pavulak believes that the amendment limits the 
meaning of ―sexual exploitation of children‖ to crimes 
involving visual depictions.  He is wrong.  That 
interpretation would ascribe the same meaning to the 
term ―sexual exploitation of children‖ in the thirty-five-
to-life category and the phrase ―the production, 
possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, 
or transportation of child pornography‖ in the twenty-
five-to-fifty category.  Ordinarily, ―we assume that 
Congress used two different [phrases] because it intended 
each [phrase] to have a particular, nonsuperfluous 
meaning.‖  United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 158 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137, 146 (1995)).  If Congress had wanted to implement 
Pavulak‘s interpretation, it could have explicitly done so 
by replacing ―the sexual exploitation of children‖ in the 
thirty-five-to-fifty category with ―the production, 
possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, 
or transportation of child pornography.‖  It is hard to 
fathom why Congress, seeking to increase the penalties 
for sexual offenses against children, would have 
amended the twenty-five-to-fifty category to ensure that 
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crimes beyond those involving visual depictions were 
included while silently limiting the qualifying crimes to 
visual depictions for the thirty-five-to-life category.  And 
given that Congress kept ―so many prior federal 
offenses‖ that trigger the thirty-five-to-life category, it is 
―implausible‖ that Congress simultaneously ―chose to 
restrict qualifying state offenses to child pornography 
production.‖ United States v. Sanchez, 440 F. App‘x 436, 
440 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (emphasis added). 
Since Pavulak‘s mandatory life sentence under 
§ 3559(e) did not exceed his maximum statutory sentence 
of life under § 2251(e), Apprendi is inapplicable.  United 
States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(―[W]hen the actual sentence imposed does not exceed 
the statutory maximum, Apprendi is not implicated.‖).  It 
was therefore constitutional for the District Court to 
determine that Pavulak‘s prior Delaware convictions 
involved ―conduct that would be a Federal sex offense‖ 
and thus triggered the mandatory life sentence in 
§ 3559(e). 
* * * * * 
Accordingly, we will affirm Pavulak‘s convictions 
and sentence. 
 
